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Abstract 
 
This paper explores the characteristics associated with the formation of bubbles that 
occurred in the Hong Kong stock market in 1997 and 2007, as well as the 2000 
dot-com bubble of Nasdaq. It examines the profitability of Technical Analysis (TA) 
strategies generating buy and sell signals with knowing and without trading rules. The 
empirical results show that by applying long and short strategies during the bubble 
formation and short strategies after the bubble burst, it not only produces returns that 
are significantly greater than buy and hold strategies, but also produces greater wealth 
compared with TA strategies without trading rules. We conclude these bubble 
detection signals help investors generate greater wealth from applying appropriate 
long and short Moving Average (MA) strategies. 
 
 
Keywords: Technical analysis, moving average, buy-and-hold strategy, dot-com 
bubble, Asian financial crisis, sub-prime crisis, moving linear regression, volatility. 
 
JEL Classifications: G1, C0. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The past two decades have witnessed three huge bubbles and crashes with deep and 
long bear markets, namely the uncontrolled exuberance during the 1990s followed by 
the Asian Financial Crisis, the dot-com bubble at the turn of the Century, and the 
bubble in the run up to the 2007 peak of over 30,000, followed by the crashes and 
bust after the bursting of the U.S. housing bubble. Many institutional investors 
suffered losses, in spite of well-established tests to detect bubbles in the stock market, 
namely excess volatility tests, cointegration tests, duration dependence tests, and the 
intrinsic bubbles model.  
 
If such well-established tests for the existence of bubbles are available, why do 
such bubbles occur? Why do most investors fail to avoid the bursting of bubbles by 
simply leaving the market early when signals, as suggested by these quantitative tests, 
purportedly detect the existence of a bubble. One possible explanation may be that 
even though investors may be fooled into buying an overpriced asset, they believe that 
the market is populated by greater fools who are willing to buy at an even higher price, 
the so-called “greater fool” theory. Mokhtar et al. (2006) suggest that such speculators 
know that stock prices have exceeded their fundamental value, but they still trade 
while thinking that the bubble will continue. Another possible explanation is that, in 
practice, these bubble detection techniques are too difficult and are not available to 
the average investor, who have no tools to detect the stock bubbles. Consequently, 
such investors are not able to leave early when these signals occur to avoid market 
crashes and bear markets, thereafter suffering huge losses. 
 
In this paper, we develop simple bubble detection signals that can be used by 
investors and regulators. We do so by analyzing the 1997 stock bubble of the Hang 
Seng Index (HIS), 2000 dot-com bubble, and 2008 stock bubble of HSI. In sum, we 
identify four properties associated with the creation and bursting of bubbles, and they 
serve as selling signals for investors to leave the market early before the horrendous 
bursting of bubbles. The four properties are as follows: (1) the run-up of abnormally 
high returns in the formation of the bubble, (2) the deviation of stock price from one 
standard deviation trend line by more than 10%, (3) an increase in the volatility of 
stock returns, and (4) the decline in stock prices below the one standard deviation 
trend line. 
 
After identifying these four signals, we suggest a trading rule to profit from the 
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bursting of a bubble. We assess the performance of different buy/sell rules, namely 
technical analysis tools from the moving average (MA) family, including simple MA 
rules, dual MA rules, exponential MA rules for the three bubbles to examine which 
strategies can help investors profit even during bubble formation and bursting. Our 
findings show that MAs perform significantly better than the buy and hold (BH) 
strategy, even under transaction costs. In particular, we find that MA20 rule is able to 
generate the greatest wealth for investors. 
 
The remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of 
the literature on speculative bubbles and technical analysis. Section 3 examines the 
four properties associated with the building up and bursting of a bubble, with 
empirical results from the 97, dot-com and 07 bubbles. The methodology in 
constructing the figures will be discussed. Then we suggest a trading rule to profit 
from the bursting of bubbles. In Section 4, different buy/sell strategies, including 
MA(5), MA(10), MA(20), MA(30), MA(50), DMA(5,20), DMA(5,30), EMA(5), 
EMA(10) and EMA(20), are examined. We recommend trading strategies for 
investors to avoid similar crashes and to capture investment opportunities.  
 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Technical analysis (TA) has a long history of identifying and moving with the trend. It 
goes back to the 1700s, when Japanese rice traders traded on the Dojima Rice 
Exchange. TA was used widely after the 1800s, with Charles Dow laying the 
foundation for modern technical analysis. Later it evolved into Chartism in the early 
20th Century with mechanical trading rules to generate buy/sell signals. The advent of 
computers enabled analysts to combine fundamental economic data with price and 
volume data to produce new indicators.  
 
TA is applicable to stocks, indices, commodities, futures or any tradable instrument 
where prices are influenced by supply and demand. TA is used to analyse historical 
data on prices to determine future prices on the basis of trends. There are two groups 
of TA, namely trend-following indicators and counter-trend indicators. Wong et al. 
(2003) find that most of the counter-trend indicators do not perform well in signaling. 
Since the seminal work of Friedman (1953) and Fama (1970), TA as a forecasting tool 
has been controversial. Some literature has found that TA is not useful and cannot beat 
buy-and-hold strategies if transaction costs are incorporated. This is probably due to 
the fact there are periods when prices do not trend and fluctuate randomly (Schwager, 
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1995). The goal of Chartism is to identify periods of non-random major trends. 
 
Early empirical research by Roberts (1959) and Brealey (1969) present evidence 
supporting the weak form of market efficiency. Alexander (1961, 1964), the first to 
confirm the profitability of technical trading on individual US stocks, finds that 
profitability disappears when trading costs are introduced. Fama and Blume (1966), 
Jensen and Benington (1970), Fama (1970), and Fong and Yong (2005) observe some 
merit in TA. Fama and Blume (1966) even find that returns could be negative under 
transaction costs. Their work is consistent with the efficient market hypothesis, which 
state that current price reflects all available information, including the past history of 
prices and trading volume, so that one cannot expect abnormal returns (Fama, 1970). 
Sweeney (1988) shows that filter rules similar to that of Fama and Blume (1966) can 
produce profits depending on the level of transaction costs. 
 
Many researchers (see Fama (1965) and Neftci (1991) among others) have 
concluded that TA is not able to predict future movements in the stock market, and 
that a simple buy-and-hold strategy outperforms trading rules. Isakov and Hollistein 
(1998) report that transaction costs eliminate technical trading profits in the Swiss 
stock market. They suggest conditions where large investors may profit from moving 
average trading rules. However, Frankel and Froot (1990) find that there was a shift 
from fundamentals to TA in the 1980s, and that market practitioners rely on TA in 
forecasting the market. Moreover, the prevalence of real time information services 
that provide detailed, comprehensive and up-to-date technical analysis information, 
such as Reuters and Telerate, suggests that TA is used widely.  
 
Mills (1997) analyses the trading rules using data from the London Stock 
Exchange FT30 index for the period 1935-1994, and finds that the rules actually work 
for the most of the sample period, at least up to the 1980’s. However, these findings 
are also contradictory, as after the 1980’s the buy-and-hold strategy dominates the 
trading rule strategy. Chong and Ng (2008) reexamine the issue by using the same 
data set as Mills, but divide the data into three samples and review the RSI and 
MACD trading rules. They conclude that the RSI and MACD trading rules are able to 
out-perform the buy-and-hold strategy, and find that this conclusion is robust to their 
choice of the sample period. The returns for the trading rules are statistically 
significant at the 5% level. Other research concludes that TA contains significant 
forecasting power, and that analysts can identify a trend that can be exploited during 
the sluggish adjustment of stock price to fundamental supply and demand phenomena.  
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Wong et al. (2003) conclude that TA can be useful, and calculate test statistics 
which suggest that both MA and RSI indicators pass the tests in generating significant 
positive returns. Ratner and Leal (1999) estimate the efficacy of using technical 
trading rules (10 variable length moving averages) in emerging markets of Latin 
America and Asia. The results demonstrate on average that superior profits after 
estimated trading costs can be achieved by technical trading rules over a simple buy 
and hold strategy only in certain countries, specifically Mexico, Taiwan and Thailand. 
The profitability of technical trading rules in emerging markets may be associated 
with the persistence of returns, or autocorrelation, in these markets. Harvey (1995a) 
finds that the autocorrelation in emerging markets is much higher than in developed 
markets. Harvey (1995b) contends that emerging market returns seem to be 
predictable when using international and local risk factors.  
 
Balvers et al. (1990) find that stock returns can be predicted using national 
aggregate output. Campbell (1987), Campbell and Shiller (1988a, 1988b), Fama and 
French (1989); and Breen et al. (1990) find that stock returns can be predicted to a 
large degree by the PE ratio, dividend yields, business conditions and economic 
variables. Lo et al. (2000) find that US share prices over the period 1962-1996 are 
unusually recurrent. Although they do not show that the patterns are predictable 
enough to make sufficient profits to justify the risks, the authors conclude that this is 
possible. Wong et al. (2005) conclude that in the Shanghai, Hong Kong and Taiwan 
stock exchanges, TA outperforms a buy-and-hold strategy, and that the cumulative 
wealth obtained also surpasses that of the buy-and-hold strategy under transaction 
costs. The conclusion is that the Greater China stock markets, in general, are not 
efficient.  
 
Other work by Allen and Taylor (1990) and Neftci (1991) find that simple TA has 
significant forecasting power. Brock et al. (1992) demonstrate that a relatively simple 
set of technical trading rules possesses significant forecasting power for changes in 
the DJIA over a long sample period. However, Ready (1997) finds that, apart from the 
earlier sub-period 1970-1974, MV generally underperforms the buy and hold strategy. 
Bessembinder and Chan (1998) find that the Brock et al. (1992) trading rules can be 
profitable in some Asian countries when trading costs are considered. Hudson et al. 
(1996) find that the Brock et al. (1992) trading rules have some ability to predict the 
FT30 series of returns, but that no significant gains are found after factoring in trading 
costs.  
 
Kung and Wong (2009a) conduct an analysis using two popular trading rules, 
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namely MA and TRB, to assess whether or not the gradual liberalization of Taiwan’s 
securities markets has improved the efficiency of its stock market. The results show 
that the two rules have considerable predictive power for 1983-1990; become less 
predictive for 1991-1997; and cannot predict the market for 1998-2005. These results 
indicate that the efficiency of the Taiwan stock market has been greatly enhanced by 
the liberalization measures implemented over the last 20 years. 
 
In spite of the multitude of published papers on TA, only a few have addressed 
bubbles and downturns. Wong et al. (2001) examine whether buy/sell signals 
generated from the E/P ratio and bond yield could help investors avoid market crashes 
and beat the stock market. They conclude that the trading signals from the indicator 
can enable investors to escape from most of the crashes and catch most of the bull 
runs, thereby generating significant profits. Other attempts include Fisher and Statman 
(2003), who find that consumer confidence are able to predict some stock returns 
when predicting Nasdaq and small cap stock returns. They find a negative and 
statistically significant relationship between the level of the expectations component 
of the Conference Board confidence in one month in Nasdaq and small cap stocks in 
the following month. However, they do not find the same relationship to be 
statistically significant when considering the S&P 500 index. 
 
In addition, Lam et al. (2007) examine whether a day’s surge or plummet in stock 
price can serve as a market entry or exit signal. They find that the trading rules 
perform well in the Asian indices but not in those of Europe and the USA. In the 
aftermath of the Asian financial crisis, a series of reform and liberalization measures 
have been implemented in Singapore to upgrade its financial markets. Kung and 
Wong (2009b) investigate whether these measures have led to less profitability for 
those investors who employ technical rules for trading stocks. They find that the three 
trading rules consistently generate higher annual returns for 1988-1996 than those for 
1999-2007. Furthermore, they generally perform better than the buy-and-hold strategy 
for 1988-1996, but perform no better than the buy-and-hold strategy for 1999-2007. 
These findings suggest that the efficiency of the Singapore stock market has been 
considerably enhanced by the measures implemented after the crisis.  
 
Wong and McAleer (2009) examine the Presidential election cycle and find that 
stock prices fall during the first half of a Presidency, reach a trough in the second year, 
rise during the second half of a Presidency, and reach a peak in the third or fourth year. 
They also find that the Republican Party may have greater cause to engage in active 
policy manipulation to win re-election than their Democratic counterparts.  
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This paper is similar to Wong et al. (2005) in that we use simple TA tools, 
including the moving regression lines, and indicators such as stock returns and 
volatility to signal the formation and bursting of financial bubbles in HSI during 1997, 
2008 and Nasdaq during 2000. The paper also examines different technical trading 
rules to see which strategy is able to generate the greatest wealth for investors.  
 
 
3. Four Properties Common to the 97, dot-com and 07 Bubbles 
 
Property 1. Accumulation of abnormally high returns 
 
We first consider the 97 bubble. Table 1 shows that during the 2-year period before 
the 4 months preceding the peak of the 97 bubble, the ratio of the number of days with 
positive returns to the number of days of negative returns of the HSI daily index is 
around 53:47. However, in the 4 months preceding the 97 peak, the ratio increases to 
59:40, a significant increase in the proportion of days with positive returns. A similar 
pattern is seen in the dot-com bubble, with the ratio for Nasdaq daily returns 
increasing from 56:44 to 68:32 for the 5 months preceding the 2000 peak. A similar 
increase in the ratio is seen for the 07 bubble. The ratio increases from 56.7:42.1 for 
the period June 10, 2005 to June 11, 2007 to 58.4:37.6 for the 4 months preceding the 
07 peak.  
 
As for the size of returns, for the 97 bubble, the average daily return for HSI in 
the 2-year period before the 4 months preceding the 97 peak is merely 0.06%, but it 
increases to 0.40% for the 4 months before the 97 peak. The annualized return for the 
same 2-year period is just 16.7%, but it increases sharply to over 118.1% for the 4 
months preceding the 97 peak. For the dot-com bubble, the average daily returns for 
NASDAQ in the 2 years before 5 months preceding the 00 peak is about 0.11%, but 
then it increases five times to 0.43%, with the annualized return for the corresponding 
period increasing from 44% to about 221% (see Table 1 for further details). For the 07 
bubble, the average daily return of HSI for the 2-year period preceding 4 months 
before the 07 peak is merely 0.08%, which then increases significantly to 0.43% for 
the 4 months before the 07 peak. The annualized return for the same 2-year period is 
merely 24.1%, compared to 133.4% in the 4 months preceding the 07 peak. 
 
These results are not particularly surprising. In order to compensate for the 
possibility of a bubble bursting, investors would require higher returns during a 
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bubble than during normal times. These two facts constitute the first property of 
bubble formation, namely a significant increase in the ratio of the number of days 
with positive returns to the number of days with negative returns for the 4 months 
preceding the peak of a bubble, as well as abnormally high returns for the 4 months 
preceding the peak of a bubble. 
 
Property 2. Peak rises more than 10% above +1SD trend 
 
We plot the time series for the three bubbles examined in this paper. In order to 
construct these figures, we choose a low point in the preceding dominant upward 
trend; that is, July 14, 1995 in Figure 1A for the 97 bubble, August 31, 1998 in Figure 
1B for the dot-com bubble, and March 5, 2007 in Figure 1C for the 07 bubble. 
Thereafter, we obtain the prediction price for a certain day by regressing stock price at 
time t using the data from the starting point to time t-1. In order to do so for each time 
t, we construct the moving linear regression line. 
 
For the 97 bubble, on 7/8/97, the HSI reaches its peak of 16,673, which is far 
beyond the +1SD prediction line by 10%. As for the dot-com bubble, the rise is more 
pronounced, with the NASDAQ rising above the +1SD prediction line by more than 
17% on 10/3/00. A similar result is seen in the 07 case. On 30/10/07, the HSI reaches 
its peak of 31,638.22, which is far above the +1SD prediction line by 11%. 
 
Hence, properly 2 of a bubble is that the peak of the index could rise beyond the 
+1SD prediction line from the moving linear regression by 10% or more. 
 
Property 3. Increase in volatility 
 
The third property associated with the formation of a bubble is an increase in the 
volatility of stock returns, where return refers to log return. The volatility is simply 
the standard deviation of log returns for a specified period. During a bubble formation, 
prices rise beyond their fundamental value and are no longer driven by objective new 
information, and hence are expected to be more volatile than during normal periods. 
This is consistent with tests on volatility to detect systematic departure of stock prices 
from fundamental values.  
 
For the 97 bubble, the volatility is around 0.01 for the 2-year period before the 4 
months preceding the 97 peak, which suddenly increases to over 0.012 for the half 
year before the 97 peak, representing an increase of 20%. A similar pattern is seen for 
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the dot-com bubble, with the volatility increasing from 0.18 in the 2-year period 
before the 3 months preceding the 2000 peak to 0.23 in the 3 months preceding the 
2000 peak. The change is more pronounced for the 07 bubble. Initially, for the 2-year 
period before the 4 months preceding the 07 peak, the volatility is around 0.01. Then 
for the 4 months preceding the 07 peak, volatility increases by over 50% to 0.017 (see 
Table 2 for details). 
 
Property 4. Falling below the -1SD prediction line 
 
Referring to Figure 1, signaling the bursting of the 97 bubble is the index dropping 
below the -1SD trend line on 9/10/97. Thereafter, the HSI falls by 37% for the 19 days 
after the HSI drops below the -1SD trend line. For the following year, the index drops 
by 53%, which is a deep and long recession. For the dot-com bubble (Figure 2), the 
Nasdaq drops below the trend line on 11/9/00. Thereafter, the index falls from 4048 to 
3075 on 12/10/00, representing a decrease of 32% in just 1 month, and the index 
drops by 58% for the 6 months after the index crossed the -1SD trend line. For the 07 
bubble (Figure 3), the HSI drops below the trend line on 21/11/07. Subsequently, 2.5 
months later, the HSI drops from 27,616 on 9/1/08 to 21,758 on 22/1/08, representing 
a decrease of over 20% in just 13 days. For the 1 year after the index drops below the 
-1SD trend line, the index drops by 59%, which is even larger than the 97 bubble. 
 
Having identified the patterns in stock prices associated with the formation and 
bursting of bubbles, in the following we suggest a trading rule to profit from bubbles, 
and then examine different TA strategies to investigate whether this trading rule can 
help investors generate greater profits than without this trading rule. 
 
Trading rule condition: For a period of no less than 4 months: 
 
1. The percentage of the number of days with positive returns minus the percentage 
of the number of days with negative returns increases by more than 7 percentage 
points. 
2. The annualized return for the period increases over 100%. 
3. The Peak of the stock price rises over the +1SD trend line by more than 10%. 
4. More than 20% increase in volatility.  
 
If the above 4 conditions occur, then we suggest turning to MA short strategies 
when the stock price drops below the stock price regression line, until the stock price 
breaks a dominant downward trend. 
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4 Technical Indicators 
 
Moving Average (MA) is the most commonly used trend indicator. There are many 
studies regarding the performance of MA, but the findings are not consistent. For 
example, Brock, et al. (1992) show that MA significantly outperforms a cash 
benchmark when applied to the Dow Jones Industrial Average. However, Ready (1997) 
finds that, apart from the earliest sub-period (1970-1974), MA generally 
underperforms the buy-and-hold strategy. More recently, Wong, et al. (2003) support 
the usefulness of the MA strategy. On the other hand, Fong and Yong (2005) examine 
various MA rules and conclude there is no evidence of significant trading profits. In 
this paper, we adopt  the Moving Average strategy to examine whether we can 
profiteer from the bubbles we studies in our paper by investigating the following MA 
rules: simple Moving Average (MA), simple Exponential Moving Average (EMA), and 
Dual Moving Average (DMA). These strategies are described briefly below. 
 
1. Simple Moving Average 
 
The n-day simple Moving Average (MA) at time t, denoted by ,t nMA , is given by: 
1
,
1 t
t n i
i t n
MA C
n

 
   ,               (1)                 
where iC  is the closing price at time i. A moving average changes in response to the 
addition of a new period and the shedding of the oldest period. As the calculation 
continues, the n-day moving average increases when the closing price moves upwards 
as the added value is larger than the deleted value. In a simple MA procedure, a buy 
signal is generated when the closing price rises above MA and a sell signal is 
generated when the close falls below MA. As moving averages are lagging indicators, 
they are trend following. If a clear trend exists, this method should work adequately. 
However, if the market is moving sideways or if there is excessive volatility, there 
could be many false signals. In such cases, Bollinger Bands and the MA Channels 
may be better trading tools than the use of Moving Averages (Leung and Chong, 
2003). 
 
2. Exponential Moving Average 
 
Field	Code	Changed
Field	Code	Changed
Field	Code	Changed
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In order to reduce the lag effect from the ‘outdated’ data in simple moving averages, 
the exponential moving average strategy has been developed. The n-day Exponential 
Moving Average (EMA) at time t, denoted by ,t nEMA , is defined as: 
             nttnt EMACEMA ,1, )1(                        (2) 
with 1,1 CEMA n  . In equation (2), 1
2
 n . In addition, the first few ,t nEMA   
values will be deleted so that the initial value for ,t nEMA  will not affect ,t nEMA . 
 
 
Exponential moving averages reduce the lag effect from the ‘outdated’ data by 
assigning greater weight to more recent prices. The smoothing constant 2/(n+1) in 
formula (2) works as the weight that applies to the most recent price depending on the 
length of the moving average. The shorter is the exponential moving average, the 
greater is the weight that will be assigned to the most recent price. For example: a 
10-period exponential moving average would weight the most recent price 18.18%, 
and a 20-period exponential moving average would weight the most recent price 
9.52%.  
 
EMA will react faster to recent price changes than will a simple moving average.  
The EMA formula works by weighting the difference between the price in the current 
period and the EMA in the previous period, and then updating the result of the EMA in 
the previous period. The following diagram shows the formation of the buy and sell 
signals by the use of the MA strategy (either MA or EMA):   
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A buy signal is generated when the closing price passes the EMA from below, and a 
sell signal is generated when the closing price passes the EMA from above. As in the 
case of MA, the effectiveness of EMA is also undermined by excessive volatilities in 
stock prices.  
 
3. Dual Moving Average 
 
Another commonly used trading rule (see Brock et al., 1992) is the Dual MA (DMA) 
strategy, denoted by DMA(n,m), that consists of two MAs: a ‘short’ n-day MA, 
,t nMA , and a ‘long’ m-day MA, ,t mMA , with m > n. The rule generates a buy (sell) 
signal when the short MA rises above (falls below) the long MA. The common DMA 
rules are 1-5, 1-200, 5-10, 5-20, 5-30 and 5-200. When the DMA is formed by two 
EMAs, we call it Dual Exponential Moving Average (DEMA), denoted by 
DEMA(n,m). As in the case of DMA, there are two EMAs: a ‘short’ n-day EMA, 
,t nEMA , and a ‘long’ m-day EMA, ,t mEMA  , with m > n. The rule for the DEMA 
signals is the same as that of the DMA. The 5-20 day and 5-30 day DMA and DEMA 
strategies are examined in this paper.    
 
Unlike simple MA and EMA, DMA is less affected by excess volatilities on certain 
days due to the smoothing effect of the short MA. 
 
 
Illustration on Moving Average 
stock index MA
BUY 
Sell BUY
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5 Strategies With and Without Trading Rules 
 
The data used in this paper are the daily closing values of the Nasdaq and the Hang 
Seng Index (HSI) extracted from Yahoo.com/finance. The three periods, namely 
NASDAQ August 31, 1998 to September 9, 2002 , HSI July 14, 1995 to August 31, 
1998, and HSI March 5, 2007 to March 31, 2009, will be used to examine different 
trading strategies. For each period, they will be further divided into two periods, 
namely before and after the bursting of bubbles, which are identified by the times 
when the stock price passes below the moving regression line from the peak. The six 
periods are NASDAQ August 31, 1998 to April 12, 2000, NASDAQ April 12, 2000 to 
September 9, 2002, HSI July 14, 1995 to September 1, 1997, HSI September 1, 1997 
to August 31, 1998, HSI March 5, 2007 to November 15, 2007, and HSI November 15, 
2007 to March 31, 2009.  
 
Under our trading rule, we adopt the MA long only strategy during bubble 
formation, and for the period after the stock price dropped below the stock price 
regression line signaling the bursting of the bubble, we will adopt the MA short only 
strategy. In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed bubble detection 
signals, we will compare the above-mentioned strategy with trading rule with the MA 
strategy without a trading rule. Without a trading rule, we will adopt the MA long and 
short strategy throughout the whole period.  
 
As a strategy under the proposed trading rule, the MA short strategy is adopted 
when the four properties mentioned in Section 3 are satisfied, starting when the stock 
indexes fall below the moving linear regression lines from their peaks, until the end of 
the bear run. In Figure 1, for the 97 bubble, a trend line is drawn to pass through A, B 
and C, so that the end point of the bear run is around August 31, 1998. In Figure 2, for 
the 07 bubble, a trend line is drawn to pass through A, B and C, so that the end point 
is around March 31, 2009. For the dot-com bubble, as shown in Figure 3, a trend line 
is drawn to pass through A, B and C, so that the end point for the bear run is around 
September 9, 2002. After the end point C in Figures 1, 2 and 3, the stock indexes turn 
bull, and the short strategy is no longer profitable. 
 
Hypothesis Testing for long strategies 
 
The closing prices of the indexes are used to compute the daily returns, tr , such that 
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tr  = 100*Ln ( tC / 1tC  ), where tC  is the closing price of the index on day t. Suppose 
at time t there is a buy (sell) signal, and at time t nt  there is a sell (buy) signal, and 
form the long (short) trading strategy. The aggregate return , tt nS  will be given as 
,
1
t
t
n
t n t i
i
S r

   .          (3) 
Without loss of generality, we denote , tt nS as S t . Suppose we have the buy (sell) 
signals at t1, t2, …, tm , let  = { t1, t2, …, tm}, and define   to be the set of all these 
trading returns such that ii I   , where the { iI } are the disjoint sets of returns 
generated by the ith buy (sell) signals (namely, buy (sell) at time ti and sell (buy) at 
time ti + ni). Let n = N( ) be the number of elements in the set  , r  be the 
vector of all returns in  , and 1  be the nx1 vector of unit elements. Assume that 
the mean vector and covariance matrix of r are  and  , respectively.  
 
If   is the set of all the daily returns generated by buy signals, let longr , 
long , long , and nlong correspond to r ,  ,  , and n, respectively. Similarly, 
if  is the set of all the daily returns generated by sell signals, let shortr , short , 
short
  and nshort  correspond to r ,  ,  , and n, respectively. longr  is the 
vector of daily returns for the long strategy generated by the indicator MAt , while 
shortr  is the vector of daily returns for the short strategy generated by the indicator. 
Further define long and short  as the population means of daily returns generated by 
the buy and sell signals, respectively. 
 
The null hypothesis  
H01 : 0long   against  H11 : 0long                     (4) 
is used to test whether the return is profitable for the long strategy. On the other hand, 
the null hypothesis  
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H02 : 0short   against  H12 : 0short                   (5) 
is used to test whether the return is profitable for the short strategy. Statistics applied 
to test whether the buy and sell signals generated by the family of MA yield 
significantly positive returns for either the long and short strategies are given by:  
 
1
ˆ1 1
1 /
T
T
T
r
T
r r n
 
  
 



                                   (6)   
where r , r  and   are longr , longr  and long respectively if it is used to test 
(4) and are shortr shortr  and 
short
  respectively if it is used to test (5).  
 
We also report the mean return difference, also known as the buy-sell spread between 
the long and short strategy.  
 
The hypothesis 
 
H03 : 0   against  H11 : 0                      
 
Where 

 is the mean return of using both long and short strategies. 
 
The t-statistic for testing whether using both long and short strategies is profitable  is 
2 2/ /
long short
long long short short
r rT
n n 
  .    (7) 
 
The test statistic T will be approximately distributed as N(0,1) if   ( long and 
short ) is 0. In estimating ˆ  , we set the entries to be zero if they are not significant 
at the 5% level.  
 
For example, for the Taiwan stock market data for the simple MA(5) long 
strategy, the only significant autocorrelations are at lags 1, 3 and 4, with values of 
-0.078, -0.090 and -0.073, respectively. Thus, in testing this rule for Taiwan data, we 
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set all entries to be zero except autocorrelations at lags 1, 3 and 4.  
 
Because n is very large,  T will approach the standard normal distribution by 
virtue of the Central Limit Theorem. Thus, the profit generated by using the MAt 
strategy is significantly greater than zero if  


 positionshort  ain          -z 
position long ain           z> 


T
T
                          (7) 
where z   is the critical value such that   = P(Z > z  ) and Z follows the 
standardized normal distribution.  
 
Nonetheless, it is well known that the daily return is not i.i.d. (independent and 
identical distributed), and it is also not normal (see, for example, Fama, 1965; Fama 
and French, 1988). It is useful to refer to Lo and MacKinlay (1990) for the violation 
of the normality assumption, and Conrad and Kaul (1988) for the violation of the 
independence assumption for daily returns. In order to accommodate the possibility 
that the Central Limit Theorem is not effective for our data set, we use a bootstrap 
technique (Hall, 1992) in the empirical analysis to check for normality. The results 
obtained from the bootstrap approach are very close to those obtained by assuming 
the statistic T to approach the standard normal distribution. Thus, we only report the 
results obtained by the latter method. 
 
In order to check whether any of the moving average approaches significantly 
outperforms the BH strategy, we let BHr  and BH  be the sample and population 
means of daily returns, respectively, for the BH strategy, and use r  and n as defined 
in (6). Recall that r  is equal to longr  if   is generated by the buy signals, and is 
equal to shortr  if   is generated by the sell signals. Let  ( long and short ) be the 
mean and 2 ( 2long and 2short ) the variance of tr , respectively. Then we have 
2 1 1 /T n     , where 1 1T    is defined in (6). In order to check whether any of 
the moving average approaches significantly outperforms the BH strategy, it is 
necessary to test whether the return, long , generated by the long strategy using the 
18 
 
MA family is significantly greater than the return, BH , using the BH strategy.  
 
The analysis described above is used to test the null hypothesis  
H03 : long BH    against  H13 : long BH   .         (8) 
Similarly, the null hypothesis 
H04 : short BH   against  H14 : short BH            (9) 
is used to test whether the return, short , generated by the short strategy using the 
MA family is significantly greater than the return, BH , obtained from using the BH 
strategy. Let ( , )TBHR r r ,   represents the variance matrix of R , and introduce the 
following test statistic to test whether a long or short strategy using the buy and sell 
signals generated by the MA family significantly outperforms the BH strategy:  
 T' ≈
T
T
a R
a a
               (10) 
where (1, 1)Ta   . 
 
The statistic T' should approach the standard normal distribution by virtue of 
the Central Limit Theorem as the sample size is very large in this paper. As discussed 
above, in order to accommodate the possibility that the Central Limit Theorem is not 
effective for our data set, we use a bootstrap technique in the empirical analysis to 
check for normality. The results obtained from the bootstrap approach are very close 
to those obtained by assuming the statistic T to approach the standard normal 
distribution. Thus, we only report the results obtained by the latter method. 
 
 
 
The buy/sell strategy is significantly profitable if 
T z   in a long position 
T z   in a short position. 
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The buy/sell strategy is significantly better than the buy/hold strategy if 
'T z  for both long and short positions. 
The statistics T and T’ will be applied to the aforementioned six periods for the three 
bubble periods.  
 
Wealth analysis 
 
In addition to evaluating the performance of these TA strategies, we have also created 
a portfolio with an initial amount of $1M local currency to compare the performance 
of different strategies. As trading costs are not negligible in buy/sell strategies, it is 
necessary to take them into account. The cost of trading varies across countries. For 
Hong Kong, investors pay a stamp duty of 0.1%, as well as a small amount for 
commission, transaction levy, transfer fee, trading fee, and a transfer deed fee. For the 
USA, the trading fee normally ranges from US$9.99 to US$19.99. For simplicity, we 
will impose a transaction cost of 0.1% in both cases.  
 
 
6 Empirical Results 
 
First, we will describe market returns for the full three periods, namely NASDAQ 
31/8/98-9/9/02, HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98, and HSI 5/3/07-31/3/09. These are the returns 
that investors would receive from a buy/hold strategy. Hence, the t-value could be 
used to test whether the buy/hold strategy could generate significant returns for the 
three periods.  
 
As shown in Table 4, for all three periods, the BH strategy did not generate 
significantly positive returns in any of the three periods and actually it gives negative 
returns.Hence, it is necessary to find strategies other than a buy/hold strategy to 
generate profits from the bull and bear runs. As will be shown below, TA strategies not 
only generate significantly positive returns, but they could also generate a significant 
amount of wealth from active buying and selling strategies. 
 
Returns analysis from TA strategies under trading rules 
 
Under a trading rule, a long and short strategy is adopted during a bubble formation, 
and a short strategy is adopted after the stock price passes through the stock price 
regression line from the peak. Tables 5 to 7 report the average daily returns, and the 
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corresponding test statistics, T, under the trading rule for the 3 periods. The difference 
between the returns from the TA and BH strategies is also computed, showing the test 
statistics T’, as well as the corresponding p-values. In addition, the total numbers of 
holding days (N) generated by different strategies are also shown. 
 
In Table 5, it is found that most MA rules generate positive returns that are 
significant at the 5% level, so that we can conclude that all MA rules provide positive 
returns for the period HSI 14/7/95-1/9/97. The difference between the returns 
generated by the MA rule and BH strategy are all positive, with most being significant 
at the 5% level. Hence, we conclude that MA rules outperform the BH strategy for the 
period HSI 14/7/95-1/9/97. In Table 6, we find that the average daily returns from the 
MA strategy under our trading rule are all positive, and most are significant at the 5% 
level. Hence, we conclude that the MA rules provide significantly positive returns for 
the period NASDAQ 31/8/98-12/4/00. Moreover, the difference between the average 
daily return generated by the MA rules and the BH strategy are all positive, and all are 
significant at the 10% level. Hence, we conclude that all the MA rules outperform the 
BH strategy for the period NASDAQ 31/8/98-12/4/00. 
 
From Table 7, all the MA rules generate positive returns, and most are significant at 
the 10% level, so we can conclude that all the MA rules generate positive returns for 
the period HSI 5/3/07-15/11/07. The difference between the returns from all the MA 
rules and BH strategy are all positive, and all are significant at the 10% level, so that 
we conclude that all MA rules outperform the BH strategy for the period HSI 
5/3/07-15/11/07. 
 
TA strategies without our trading rule 
 
In Tables 8 to10, we also report the returns from TA strategies without signaling the 
bubble, that is, we adopt long and short strategies throughout the three entire periods. 
In Table 8, during HSI 14/7/1995-31/8/98, most of the MA families were able to 
generate returns that are significant at the 10% level, with most being significant at 
the 5% level. Hence, we conclude that MA families are able to generate significantly 
positive returns for the period HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98. However, the difference between 
the returns from long and short and BH strategies are not significant at the 10% level, 
so that we can conclude that long and short strategies are not able to beat the BH 
strategy for the period HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98.  
 
In Table 9 most the MA families are not able to generate significantly positive 
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returns for the period Nasdaq31/8/98-9/9/02. Moreover, the difference between the 
long and short and BH strategies are not significant at the 10% level, so that we 
conclude that MA families cannot beat the BH strategy for Nasdaq 31/8/98-9/9/02. In 
Table 10, most of the MA families did not generate returns that are significant at the 
10% level. However, the difference between returns from the long and short and BH 
strategies are significant at the 1% level, so that we conclude that long and short 
strategies are able to beat the BH strategy for the sample given in HSI 5/3/07-31/3/09. 
 
Wealth analysis with and without trading rules 
 
In order to complete the empirical analysis, we establish a portfolio with initial 
amount of $1M in the beginning of the three periods, namely HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98, 
NASDAQ 31/8/98-9/9/02, and HSI 5/3/07-31/3/09. With a trading rule, during the 
bull run (from the beginning to the point where the stock price dropped below the 
moving regression line from the peak), we adopt long and short only strategies using 
the MA family. Thereafter, we adopt short only strategies using the MA family. For 
comparison, we also establish the same portfolio for the BH strategy. The results are 
shown in Tables 11 to 13.  
 
In order to demonstrate the effectiveness of our bubble detection signals, we also 
show the wealth without a trading rule. As given in Tables 11 to 13, MA strategies 
with a trading rule are able to beat MA strategies without a trading rule by 4% to 68%. 
 
Comparing the MA strategies with and without trading rules, under a 0.1% transaction 
cost scenario, under our trading rule the MA strategies are able to outperform the MA 
strategies without a trading rule by 4% to 68%. Hence, we conclude that our bubble 
detection signals are able to help investors generate greater wealth. 
 
In Table 11, the most profitable strategies are MA5, 10, 20, DMA(5, 20) EMA5 with 
trading rule. From an initial amount of $1M, the investment grew to more than $2.2M in 
just 3 years. In Table 12, the most profitable strategies are MA20, DMA(5,30) and 
EMA20, whereby a $1M initial investment has increased to more than $2.4M in just 4 
years. In Table 13, the most profitable strategies are MA20, MA30, DMA(5,20), 
DMA(5,30) and EMA20, such that an initial investment of $1M grew to more than $1.8M 
in just 2 years.  
 
In Tables 11 to 13, we also report the wealth generated from TA strategies without trading 
rules, that is, we adopt long and sell strategies throughout the three periods. In Table 11, 
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the greatest wealth of up to 2.29M is generated from MA(5), which is 10% smaller than 
the 2.52M generated from the same TA strategies under our trading rule. In Table 12, the 
greatest wealth up to 2.39M is generated from EMA(20), which is 16% below the 2.78M 
wealth generated from a trading rule and adopted short strategies after the bubble burst. In 
Table 13, the greatest wealth is generated from MA30, generating 2.08M, compared with 
2.25M by the same TA strategies under our trading rule.  
 
In short, all MA strategies can generate significant returns, and all are able to outperform 
the BH strategies. In all three cases, MA20 consistently produces a significant amount of 
wealth using long strategies during bull runs and short strategies during bear runs. 
Moreover, comparing the TA strategies with knowing and without trading rules, the 
former is able to beat the latter substantially, so that the signalling of a bubble is able to 
help investors generate significant wealth. 
 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
In summary, there are four primary properties associated with the formation and bursting 
of bubbles. The first three are about the formation of bubbles, and the fourth one signals 
the day of reckoning when the bubble bursts. For investors with a long position in the 
stock market, a conservative strategy that might be advised is as follows: if the first three 
patterns emerge, and the HSI drops below the moving regression line (by then the stock 
price would have dropped by more than 10% from its peak), then investors should sell 
their stocks to avoid market crashes as well as a deep and long bear market.  
 
This is consonant with the idea that nobody invests in a financial bubble after it has 
burst. Most investors should have sold their shares when the index dropped below the 
-1SD trend line, by which time a market crash is highly likely, to be followed by a deep 
and long bear market. For aggressive investors, to generate the greatest wealth, they can 
adopt MA20 long and short strategies during bull runs, and MA20 short strategies after 
the stock price has dropped below the moving regression line from the peak, until the 
stock price breaks a dominant downward trend. As the analyses presented above shows, 
such strategies generate greater wealth than do BH strategies and simple TA strategies 
which adopted long and short strategies for the entire period.  
 
From the above, we conclude that TA analysis is not only useful in normal times, as 
shown in Wong et al. (2005), but TA strategies are also useful during the formation of 
bubbles and market crashes. This is not surprising as the market is regarded as highly 
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inefficient when bubbles form, such that the stock price no longer depends on 
fundamentals. By applying technical indicators, investors can ride the trends to generate 
greater wealth during bubble formation and subsequent crashes.  
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Table 1 Stock Returns before the Bubble, and During the Bull Runs and Bear Markets of the Bubble 
 Period % of positive 
returns 
% of negative 
returns 
average daily 
returns 
returns for the period 
(annualized) 
97 Bubble 
July 17, 1995 
to  
April 29, 1997  
52.60% 47.40% 0.06% 16.70%   
April 29, 1997 
to  
August 7, 
1997  
  59.40% 40.60% 0.40% 118.10%   
July 7, 1995 to 
August 13, 
1998  51.10% 48.90% -0.05% -10.40%   
dot‐com bubble 
January 2, 
1997 to 
October 19, 
1999  56.50% 43.50% 0.11% 44.40%   
October 19, 
1999 to  
March 10, 
2000 68.00% 32.00% 0.63% 221.30%   
August 31, 
1998 to 
September 
9,2002  53.40% 46.60% 0.00% 0.30%   
07 Bubble 
June 13, 2005 
to  
June 11, 2007 
  56.70% 42.10% 0.08% 24.10%   
June 11, 2007 
to   
October 30, 58.40% 37.60% 0.43% 133.40%   
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2007 
   
June 10, 2005 
to March 9, 
2009  53.00% 45.20% -0.02% -6.10%   
The table shows the percentage of days with positive and negative returns, the average daily returns and 
returns for the period (annualized) for the periods before and during the bubble formation. 
Table2: Volatility of log returns 
97 bubble dot-com bubble 07 bubble 
HSI Nasdaq HSI 
Period 
Volatility of log 
return 
Period 
Volatility of log 
return 
Period 
Volatility of log 
return 
July 17, 1995 
to April 29, 
1997 
0.01 
August 31, 1998 
to January 4, 2000 0.018 
June 13, 
2005 to 
June 11, 
2007  0.009 
February 10, 
1997 to 
August 7, 
1997  0.012 
January 4, 2000 to 
March 10, 2000  0.024 
June 11, 
2007 to 
October 
30, 2007  0.017 
The table shows the volatility of stock returns before and during the bubble formation. 
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Table 1 
Stock Returns before the Bubble,  
and During the Bull Runs and Bear Markets of the Bubble 
 
 Period 
% of positive 
returns 
% of negative 
returns 
average daily 
returns 
returns for the period 
(annualized) 
97 Bubble 
July 17, 1995 to  
April 29, 1997  52.6% 47.4% 0.06% 16.7% 
April 29, 1997 to 
August 7, 1997  59.4% 40.6% 0.40% 118.1% 
July 7, 1995 to 
August 13, 1998  51.1% 48.9% -0.05% -10.4% 
Dot-com bubble 
January 2, 1997 to 
October 19, 1999  56.5% 43.5% 0.11% 44.4% 
October 19, 1999 
to  
March 10, 2000 68.0% 32.0% 0.63% 221.3% 
August 31, 1998 
to 
September 9,2002 53.4% 46.6% 0.00% 0.3% 
07 Bubble 
June 13, 2005 to  
June 11, 2007 56.7% 42.1% 0.08% 24.1% 
June 11, 2007 to  
October 30, 2007 58.4% 37.6% 0.43% 133.4% 
June 10, 2005 to  
March 9, 2009  53.0% 45.2% -0.02% -6.1% 
 
The table shows the percentage of days with positive and negative returns, the average daily returns and 
returns for the period (annualized) for the periods before and during the bubble formation. 
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Table 2  
Volatility of log returns 
 
97 bubble dot-com bubble 07 bubble 
HSI Nasdaq HSI 
Period 
Volatility of 
log return Period 
Volatility of 
log return Period 
Volatility of 
log return 
July 17, 1995  
to  
April 29, 1997 
 0.01 
August 31, 1998 
to  
January 4, 2000 
 0.018 
June 13, 2005  
to  
June 11, 2007 
 0.009 
February 10, 1997 
to  
August 7, 1997 
 0.012 
January 4, 2000 
to  
March 10, 2000 
 0.024 
June 11, 2007  
to  
October 30, 2007
 0.017 
The table shows the volatility of stock returns before and during the bubble formation. 
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Table 3  
Summary Statistics of Returns 
 
Statistic 97 bubble (HSI) dot-com bubble 07 bubble  
Period 1995-1998 1998-2002 2007-2009 
N 764 1010 764 
Mean -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.001 
Median 0.0004 0.0015 0 
Maximum 0.17 0.13 0.13 
Minimum -0.15 -0.1 -0.14 
Var 0.0004 0.0006 0.0007 
Skewness 0.21445 0.14773 0.1523 
Kurtosis 15.45 1.49 4.63 
Jarque-Bera test 4940.102158 99.62794074 87.53151693 
Runs test <0.0001*** 0.592 <0.0001*** 
Ljung-Box-Pierce  
Q statistics Q(12) 0.165 0.042 0.25 
 
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
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Table 4  
Returns from BH Strategy 
 
Index Period n Mean (R(bh)) Var t p-value 
HSI 1995-1998 764 -0.05% 0.04% -0.68 0.25 
Nasdaq 1998-2002 1010 -0.01% 0.06% -0.18 0.43 
HSI 2007-2009 764 -0.10% 0.07% -1.04 0.15 
BH strategies give negative returns for all three periods. 
N denotes the number of days during each period. 
T is the standard t statistic of whether the mean returns from the buy/hold strategy is significantly 
different from zero. 
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Table 5  
HSI 1995-1998 Testing Daily Returns of the TA Strategy (under trading rule) 
 
 
Rule N R T p-value R-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 655 0.25% 3.15 0.001*** 0.30% 2.78 0.003*** 
MA(10) 663 0.18% 2.36 0.009*** 0.23% 2.19 0.014** 
MA(20) 652 0.19% 2.41 0.008 *** 0.24% 2.23 0.013** 
MA(30) 654 0.12% 1.54 0.062 * 0.17% 1.60 0.055* 
MA(50) 628 0.14% 1.76 0.039 ** 0.19% 1.76 0.039** 
DMA(5,20) 648 0.18% 2.28 0.011 ** 0.23% 2.14 0.016** 
DMA(5,30) 652 0.10% 1.28 0.100 * 0.15% 1.41 0.080* 
EMA(5) 660 0.22% 2.83 0.002 *** 0.27% 2.54 0.006*** 
EMA(10) 672 0.18% 2.35 0.010 * 0.23% 2.18 0.015** 
EMA(20) 656 0.17% 2.14 0.016 0.22% 2.04 0.021** 
***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.10 
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Table 6  
Nasdaq 1998-2002 Testing Daily Returns of the TA Strategy (under trading rule) 
 
 
Rule  N R T p-value R-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 728 0.15% 1.68            0.046** 0.17% 1.40            0.081* 
MA(10) 765 0.15% 1.66            0.048 ** 0.16% 1.37            0.085 * 
MA(20) 758 0.19% 2.12            0.017 ** 0.20% 1.72            0.042 **
MA(30) 770 0.19% 2.12            0.017 ** 0.20% 1.71            0.043 **
MA(50) 723 0.16% 1.71            0.044 ** 0.17% 1.42            0.078 * 
DMA(5,20) 757 0.13% 1.45            0.074 * 0.14% 1.21            0.113  
DMA(5,30) 765 0.20% 2.22            0.013 ** 0.21% 1.79            0.037 **
EMA(5) 736 0.15% 1.62            0.052 * 0.16% 1.35            0.088 * 
EMA(10) 745 0.19% 2.11            0.018 ** 0.20% 1.72            0.043 **
EMA(20) 771 0.21% 2.38            0.009 *** 0.22% 1.91            0.028 **
 
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
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Table 7  
HSI 2007-2009 Testing Daily Returns of the TA Strategy 
 
 
Rule N R T p-value R-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 363 0.16% 1.17            0.122 0.26% 1.55            0.061* 
MA(10) 367 0.23% 1.64 
           0.051 
* 0.32% 1.93 
           0.027 
** 
MA(20) 372 0.23% 1.65 
           
0.050**  0.32% 1.94 
           0.026 
** 
MA(30) 363 0.31% 2.20 
           0.014 
** 0.40% 2.40 
           0.008 
*** 
MA(50) 375 0.25% 1.80 
           0.036 
** 0.34% 2.06 
           0.020 
** 
DMA(5,2
0) 371 0.24% 1.78 
           0.037 
** 0.34% 2.05 
           0.020 
** 
DMA(5,3
0) 358 0.25% 1.80
           0.036 
** 0.35% 2.07 
           0.019 
** 
EMA(5) 368 0.20% 1.48 
           0.070 
** 0.30% 1.80 
           0.036 
** 
EMA(10) 381 0.21% 1.56 
           0.059 
* 0.31% 1.87 
           0.031 
** 
EMA(20) 408 0.23% 1.74 
           0.041 
** 0.33% 2.01 
           0.022 
** 
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
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Table 8  
HSI July 14, 1995 to August 31, 1998 
 
Rule Long & short 
 N R(long & short) T p-value R(long & short)-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 754 0.20% 2.75 0.003*** 0.25% 2.43 0.008*** 
MA(10) 754 0.14% 1.92 0.027 ** 0.10% 0.97 0.165 
MA(20) 732 0.14% 1.89 0.029 ** 0.10% 0.97 0.167 
MA(30) 729 0.07% 0.95 0.172 0.03% 0.29 0.386 
MA(50) 682 0.11% 1.44 0.075 * 0.07% 0.66 0.253 
DMA(5,20) 731 0.14% 1.89 0.029 ** 0.10% 0.97 0.167 
DMA(5,30) 727 0.06% 0.81 0.209 0.02% 0.19 0.423 
EMA(5) 753 0.18% 2.47 0.007 *** 0.14% 1.36 0.086* 
EMA(10) 757 0.14% 1.93 0.027 ** 0.10% 0.97 0.165 
EMA(20) 740 0.12% 1.63 0.051 * 0.08% 0.78 0.219 
 
*, **, *** represent 10%, 5%, 1% significance for returns, respectively. 
Long and short strategies are adopted throughout the whole period, without our trading rule. 
MA families are able to generate significantly positive returns for the period HSI 14/7/95-31/8/98. 
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Table 9  
Nasdaq August 31, 1998 to September 9, 2002 
 
 
Rule Long & short 
  N R(long & short) T p-value R(long & short)-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 1004 0.06% 0.76  0.22  0.07% 0.67  0.25  
MA(10) 1027 0.07% 0.89  0.19  0.08% 0.75  0.23  
MA(20) 989 0.12% 1.58  0.06*  0.14% 1.25  0.11  
MA(30) 980 0.14% 1.79  0.04**  0.15% 1.40  0.08**  
MA(50) 895 0.08% 0.98  0.16  0.09% 0.83  0.20  
DMA(5,20) 987 0.05% 0.69  0.24  0.07% 0.62  0.27  
DMA(5,30) 974 0.13% 1.61  0.05 * 0.14% 1.27  0.10*  
EMA(5) 1002 0.05% 0.66  0.25  0.06% 0.59  0.28  
EMA(10) 991 0.09% 1.20  0.12  0.11% 0.98  0.16  
EMA(20) 996 0.14% 1.78  0.04 ** 0.15% 1.39  0.08*  
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
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Table 10  
HSI March 5, 2007 to March 31, 2009 
 
Rule Long & short 
  N R(long) T p-value R(long & short)-R(bh) T' p-value 
MA(5) 494 0.07% 0.60 0.27 0.17% 2.41 0.008*** 
MA(10) 494 0.09% 0.73 0.23 0.19% 2.63 0.004*** 
MA(20) 467 0.11% 0.89 0.19 0.21% 2.72 0.003*** 
MA(30) 448 0.22% 1.76 0.04 ** 0.32% 3.97 <0.001*** 
MA(50) 445 0.18% 1.44 0.08 * 0.28% 3.44 <0.001*** 
DMA(5,20) 464 0.13% 1.07 0.14 0.23% 3.00 0.001*** 
DMA(5,30) 446 0.15% 1.17 0.12 0.24% 3.03 0.001*** 
EMA(5) 496 0.10% 0.83 0.20 0.20% 2.81 0.002*** 
EMA(10) 498 0.06% 0.54 0.29 0.16% 2.33 0.010*** 
EMA(20) 497 0.13% 1.10 0.14 0.23% 3.26 0.001*** 
 
*** p < 1%, ** p < 5% , * p < 10%.  
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Table 11  
HSI July 14, 1995 to August 31, 1998  
Wealth from TA Strategy (with 0.1% transaction costs) 
 
Rule under trading rule without trading rule   
  Weatlh(0.1% cost) Wealth(0.1% cost) 
Outperforme
d by 
BH 0.62     
MA(5) 2.52 
                    
2.29  10.00%
MA(10) 2.21 
                    
1.99  10.95%
MA(20) 2.32 
                     
2.12  9.43%
MA(30) 1.67 
                    
1.42  17.69%
MA(50) 1.84 
                    
1.77  4.20%
DMA(5,20) 2.37 
                    
2.21  7.24%
DMA(5,30) 1.61 
                    
1.39  15.58%
EMA(5) 2.34 
                    
2.12  10.38%
EMA(10) 2.19 
                    
1.97  11.38%
EMA(20) 2.10 
                    
1.88  11.90%
 
A portfolio of $1M is set up at the beginning of the 3 periods. Transaction costs of 0.1% are considered. Under our 
trading rule, long and short strategy is adopted from the low point of the bull market up to the point when the stock 
index dropped from its peak to below the predicted stock index Pred Zt Price (refers to Figures 1-3). Thereafter, a 
short strategy is taken until the stock price broke the downwad trend ABC by passing through point C. Without a 
trading rule, long and short strategies are adopted throughout the whole period. As Tables 11 to 13 show, the 
bubble detection signals enable investors to generate greater wealth from 7% to 68%. 
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Table 12  
NASDAQ August 31, 1998 to September 9, 2002  
Wealth from TA Strategy (with 0.1% transaction costs) 
 
Rule under trading rule without trading rule   
  Weatlh(0.1% cost) Wealth(0.1% cost) 
 Outperformed 
by 
BH 0.86     
MA(5) 1.71 
                      
1.07  60.15%
MA(10) 1.95 
                      
1.30  49.84%
MA(20) 2.48 
                      
2.17  14.27%
MA(30) 2.43 
                      
2.32  4.92%
MA(50) 2.16 
                      
1.77  22.27%
DMA(5,20) 1.93 
                      
1.49  29.68%
DMA(5,30) 2.84 
                      
2.48  14.31%
EMA(5) 1.70 
                      
1.01  67.90%
EMA(10) 2.34 
                      
1.61  45.30%
EMA(20) 2.78 
                      
2.39  16.42%
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Table 13  
HSI March 5, 2007 to March 31, 2009  
Wealth from TA Strategy (with 0.1% transaction costs) 
 
Rule under trading rule without trading rule   
  Weatlh(0.1% cost) Wealth(0.1% cost) 
Outperformed 
by 
BH 0.24     
MA(5) 1.30 
                       
1.01  28.76%
MA(10) 1.76 
                       
1.29  36.29%
MA(20) 1.88 
                       
1.48  26.77%
MA(30) 2.25 
                       
2.08  8.23%
MA(50) 1.95 
                       
1.76  10.80%
DMA(5,20) 2.00 
                       
1.66  20.27%
DMA(5,30) 1.97 
                       
1.72  14.33%
EMA(5) 1.54 
                       
1.17  31.64%
EMA(10) 1.67 
                       
1.13  47.77%
EMA(20) 1.92 
                       
1.60  20.15%
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Figure 1A 
Time Series Plot of Hang Sang Index with Prediction for 1997 Bubble 
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Figure 1B 
Time Series Plot of Nasdaq with Prediction for dot-com Bubble 
 
Nasdaq moving regression: 98-02
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Figure 1C 
Time Series Plot of Hang Seng Index with Prediction for 07 Bubble 
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Zt denotes the stock index. Predict Zt Price is the predicted stock price from a linear regression. 
Pred Zt Price + 1SD/-1SD is the predicted stock price +1SD/-1SD away from the regression price. 
 
